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Representation and the Unpresentable 
Charles Campbell 
Using the writings of Jean-Francois Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault 
and Michel de Certeau, the first section of this paper provides a theoretical analysis 
suggesting a means of approaching a problem that has characterized much of 
postmodern thought: the problem of representing the unpresentable. To substantiate 
this analysis, the second section of this paper will show the ways in which this idea 
circulates in the work of Samuel Beckett, in general, and in Waiting for Godot in 
particular. 
In The Postmodern Explained, Jean-Francois Lyotard offers the following 
statement in his elaboration of the Kantian philosophy of the sublime: 
The postmodern would be that which in the modern invokes the 
unpresentable in presentation itself, that which refuses the 
consolation of correct forms, refuses the consensus of taste 
permitting common experience of nostalgia for the impossible, 
and inquires into new presentations—not to take pleasure in them, 
but to better produce the feeling that there is something 
unpresentable.1 
This phrase is often referenced in order to situate discussions of the postmodern, 
but in its elements it also serves to open a discussion into the possibilities of 
engagement with the notion of representation and that of the unpresentable. The 
idea of the intersection of representation with the unpresentable does not begin 
with Lyotard, but his essay offers an opening point from which to explore these 
ideas. 
Lyotard suggests that the issue of the presentation of the unpresentable 
is central in the constitution of the postmodern.2 For Lyotard, it is the invocation of 
the unpresentable, the demonstration that there is a conceivable which is not 
presentable, which motivates and constitutes the ways in which various avant-
gardes have "humiliated and disqualified reality by their scrutiny of the pictorial 
techniques used to instill a belief in it."3 This is a committed effort to work against 
the mode of thought that produces a "nostalgia for the all and the one, for a 
reconciliation of the concept and the sensible, for a transparent and communicable 
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experience."4 Lyotard calls for a resistance to the accepted and acceptable. This 
demands that the artist "work without rules for what will have been made"' 
attempting to create, without rules, new rules that will not be known until the 
work has been finished.5 
Lyotard articulates the relationship of representation to the unpresentable 
as one in which the unpresentable is unknown and immobile. It is representation 
that must actively invoke the unpresentable. In a sense, the unpresentable must be 
defended against actions that would disguise it. "Let us attest to the unpresentable; 
let us activate the differends and save the honor of the name."6 The battle then 
becomes one of modes of representation—between those that would attempt to 
create the illusion of unity between the conceivable and the presentable and those 
that work to "expose the artifices of presentation that allow thought to be enslaved 
by the gaze and diverted from the unpresentable." 7 The engagement of 
representation with the unpresentable is a one-sided movement of representation 
invoking the absence of the unpresentable. In so doing, this engagement exposes 
other mechanisms which claim to perform a reconciliation of the conceivable and 
the sensible. 
Michel Foucault, in his Archaeology of Knowledge, suggests particular 
strategies for exploring such ideas as "representation" and "the unrepresentable" 
in their specific relations in discourse. Foucault's archeology analyzes relations 
among discursive practices in order to differentiate statements and show their 
dispersion. 
But if we isolate, in relation to the language and the thought, the 
occurrence of the statement/event, it is not in order to spread 
over everything a dust of facts. It is in order to be sure that this 
occurrence is not linked with synthesizing operations of a purely 
psychological kind . . . and to be able to grasp other forms of 
regularity, other types of relations.8 
In avoiding the unities of tradition, influence, and the oeuvre, this development of 
Foucault's archaeology allows us to view discourse and discursive practices as 
elements surfacing unbidden in an open field where their relations with other practices 
become specifiable. The different ideas of the unpresentable can therefore be 
thought of as existing within a space, a "space in which discursive events are 
deployed."9 This space will have aspects and attributes specific to a particular 
case of the unpresentable as it is revealed in discourse. 
As characterized by Foucault, discourse is a practice which can be defined 
by specific relations.1 0 Within discourse then, or as a series of practices, 
representation can be thought of as entering into a relation with this space of the 
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unpresentable. How this interaction is described, analyzed, interpreted, or identified 
will determine fundamental aspects of our thinking about representation and the 
unpresentable. "Identity freezes the gesture of thinking," Michel de Certeau asserts 
in Heterologies, "It pays homage to an order."11 
The interaction of representational practices with the space in which the 
unpresentable is found can consequently be examined as a relationship of a space 
with the practices that open it to passage. Two further ideas elaborate this notion 
of passage through a space: Michel de Certeau's notion of tactics and strategies in 
The Practice of Everyday Life, and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's notion of 
nomad, or haptic space in A Thousand Plateaus. 
Michel de Certeau discusses the distinction between tactics and strategies 
in his sociological investigation, The Practice of Everyday Life. According to de 
Certeau, a strategy is: 
a calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that be-
comes possible as soon as a subject with will and power (a busi-
ness, an army, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated. It 
postulates a place that can be delimited as its own and serve as 
the base from which relations with an exteriority composed of 
targets or threats (customers or competitors, enemies, the coun-
try surrounding the city, objectives and objects of research, etc.) 
can be managed.12 
A tactic, on the other hand, is: 
a calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus. 
. . . Thus it must play on and with a terrain imposed on it and 
organized by the law of a foreign power. It does not have the 
means to keep to itself, at a distance, in a position of withdrawal, 
foresight, and self-collection It operates in isolated actions, 
blow by blow.13 
A strategy "postulates a place." By assuming the truth of the place and claiming it 
for its own, a strategy imposes its own order upon the space in which it operates. A 
tactic "must play on and with a terrain imposed upon it." Tactics make no claim on 
the space they pass through because they lack the means of doing so. A tactic is 
an opportunity for action seized while in a space not one's own, a space that has 
been claimed by and "organized by the law of a foreign power." 
The distinction involved in the definition of tactics and strategies inter-
sects with issues of control and ownership. A strategy defines ownership, or what 
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does and does not belong to an evolving structure. By postulating a place, a strat-
egy can begin to delimit what belongs to it as its own. The definition of an "owned" 
place allows breathing room in which to capitalize on acquisitions and prepare for 
the future. This "owned" place is therefore somewhat independent of the exigen-
cies of time. A strategy is also "a mastery of places through sight."14 The claim-
ing of a place establishes a structure which determines what does and does not 
belong. Whatever does not belong can then be seen as an object which can further 
be subjected to a binary distinction: interior or exterior, included or excluded. 
Necessary to the existence of strategy is a certain power that allows the claiming 
of place and the division of interior and exterior. It is not possible to strategize 
without this strength. 
A tactic on the other hand "is an art of the weak."15 The greater the 
strength one has the less mobile one necessarily becomes. An army of thousands 
is stronger, but less mobile, than a small band of guerrillas. Conversely, the more 
mobility one has the lesser the strength. Without the strength to establish a place 
that is "owned" a tactic relies on opportunities that appear. Without the power to 
establish a claim there can be no time to plan or prepare. There is no mastery of 
place over time. Without its own place a tactic must continually move and operate 
only with immediate, local options. Without this place there can be no position 
from which to distinguish interior and exterior. There is no mastery of sight without 
an "owned" place. 
The practices of representation that allow us to enter the space of the 
unpresentable vary in form, function, mode, and force as well as in number, style, 
and the extent to which they allow us access. They are tactical in their specificity to 
their particular historical moment of appearance. They do not have the unity or 
organizational strength to be described as strategic. The space of the unpresentable 
is too vast and changing for any practice or set of practices to establish a territory. 
The space of the unpresentable these practices encounter and open to 
passage can be thought of in terms of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's notion of 
nomad, or haptic space, as they discuss it in A Thousand Plateaus. In order to 
discuss two different kinds of space (the smooth and the striated), Deleuze and 
Guattari use nomad art as a model. Nomad art utilizes close-range vision and not 
long-distance vision; an abstract line instead of a concrete line; and haptic space, 
instead of optical space. Tactile, haptic space is opposed to optical space in that it 
is not oriented by the visual. Rather it is negotiated by a sense of touch, it is tactile 
space: "One is not 'in front of any more than one is 'in,' (one is 'on' . . .)." 1 6 
Haptic space requires contact and interaction with surroundings, consequently its 
orientation is absolutely local. Optical space, using long-distance vision, does not 
need this contact because of its visualized delimiting boundaries. "The nomad, 
nomad space, is localized and not delimited."17 
Haptic space is smooth rather than striated. That is to say, the work of 
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nomad art is not arranged along lines of perspective: presenting an image which 
places the viewer as subject consuming or reflecting the art object. The work of 
nomad art is smooth: "orientations, landmarks, and linkages are in continuous 
variation." There are no lines that operate to divide and occupy the space. The 
nomad moves between multiple points and not directly from one to another. The 
movement is made possible by an absence of orienting striations. Like walking 
through a snowstorm at the North Pole, there are no stable landmarks which can be 
used to locate one's self according to an immobile outside representation like a 
map. One must use local orientations that shift from location to location. One must 
operate step by step. In a haptic arrangement of space there is no visual model of 
united reference points for an outside observer. 
The passage through this haptic space of the unpresentable does not allow 
an overall view of its arrangement. The occurrences of the unpresentable are never 
seen as complete or in their entirety. Representational practices can be explored 
locally as they interact with the space of the unpresentable. By investigating the 
relationship of representation and the unpresentable as these ideas appear in places 
such as Lyotard's discussion of the postmodern, Gilles Deleuze's discussion of a 
Francis Bacon painting, or in Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot, further relations 
are revealed and other ways of thinking about this relationship become possible. 
This mode of investigation examines the possibilities of movement among the 
pre-existing relations in an open field of discourse. 
Consequently, questions that would identify marks of status or identity— 
questions of perspective and position—retreat in the face of other questions 
concerning passage, momentary relations, and traces of previous movement. In 
this configuration, the relationship between representation and the unpresentable 
are specifiable; but the demands for authorization, legitimization, or justification 
that can accompany examinations of a more optic nature are replaced by 
investigations of the forces and practices that function within this haptic space. 
For example, in a specific instance of representation, which practices allow the 
unpresentable to make its presence known in the space of discourse? Which 
practices establish a mode of representation that can only reflect the accepted and 
acceptable? Which modes of representation allow movement to occur? Which 
practices work to situate or stabilize the unpresentable through representation? 
This mode of proceeding offers an investigation of such questions in order to 
begin to examine the possibilities of thought surrounding this relationship. The 
question of what responses are possible in representing the unpresentable might 
then be phrased: What movement is it possible to make in this turbulent space? 
Two of the pre-existing relations in this space have been articulated by 
Jean Frangois Lyotard and Gilles Deleuze. As suggested earlier, Lyotard's call for 
resistance in The Postmodern Explained describes a relation of representation to 
the unpresentable in which the unpresentable is unknown and immobile. Deleuze 
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examines the painting of Francis Bacon and his use of the violence of sensation. 
Another set of relations between representation and the unpresentable is 
articulated in Gilles Deleuze's discussion of the painting of Francis Bacon. In 
discussing Bacon's use of sensation ("that which is directly transmitted and which 
avoids the boredom of a story to be told"18 ) Deleuze writes: 
To the violence of that which is represented (the sensational, the 
cliche) the violence of sensation is opposed. The latter is identical 
with its direct action upon the nervous system, the levels through 
which it passes and the domains which it traverses; being itself 
figure, it owes nothing to the nature of the object which is figured. 
It is as in Artaud: cruelty is not what we believe, and it depends 
less and less on that which is represented.19 
This is more than a rejection of an aesthetic standard—and more than a rejection 
of representation understood as a doubling, or mirrored image. Deleuze suggests 
that Bacon's paintings do not paint the image of violence. Rather, he opposes the 
violence of sensation to the image of violence; a violence more easily ascribed to 
the relation between the work and its audience. The direct action upon the nervous 
system constitutes part of a mode of representation which would allow this violence 
of sensation to take place. The unpresentable is not located in an image of violence. 
It will not fit in the frame of figuration. Instead, it demands a different mode of 
representation to accommodate itself. 
This mode of representation does not allow a relegation of the violence of 
the work to the figured objects, the painter, the viewer, or the paint. Deleuze writes, 
"Bacon has always wanted to eliminate the 'sensational,' that is, the primary figuration 
of that which provokes a violent sensation."20 The violence is not to be found 
within the mirror of representation. It is always elsewhere. "When he paints the 
screaming pope, there is nothing that causes horror . . . ; it is rather the way in 
which the pope himself sees nothing and screams in the presence ofthe invisible."21 
The cause of the violence of sensation, or that which causes the horror of the 
image, is invisible but present. This invisibility is not quiet or still. In fact, it is a 
force which makes its presence known. 
Where the unpresentable can be found, or where it comes from, loses 
importance here. It is not a question of location, seizure and identification. It is not 
a lost object. The unpresentable nevertheless makes itself known. The images in 
Bacon's paintings often appear to undergo a violent movement. This violent 
movement that Bacon's paintings obtain does not explain the violence of sensation, 
the unpresentable. It is not an aspect of the unpresentable caught in a spasm 
frozen in time. Instead, "levels of sensation explain that which subsists of 
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movement."22 It is the unpresentable which impacts the space of representation 
and releases the violence of sensation as part of the violent movement. The invisible 
reveals its presence without becoming visible. The spasm in Bacon's painting, 
says Deleuze, this violent movement, is one which reveals "the action of invisible 
forces on the body."23 
The scream of the pope in the presence of the invisible and the action of 
invisible forces on the body both suggest that the relationship between 
representation and the unpresentable is here one of an interaction of forces. Through 
Bacon's practices, the dimension where the unpresentable resides is prodded. 
Without becoming visible in the the optical space of the painting, the force of the 
unpresentable impacts the representational space. Its effects surface in this 
representational space and ripple outward. The invisible unpresentable releases a 
movement which is only apparent by its effects on the visible. The relationship is 
interactive but without contact, allowing the presence of the unpresentable to 
become known. But this presence of the unpresentable is made possible only 
within a particular mode of representation. Or rather, Bacon's practices establish 
and constitute a particular mode of representation which allows the unpresentable 
to surface. 
The question of representing the unpresentable can here be opened to 
one of the relation between particular modes of representation and particular 
representational practices. An investigation of the possibilities of thought 
surrounding the subject suggests an investigation of representational practices in 
order to delineate a particular mode of representation. The function and nature of 
representation and the unpresentable can there be identified in their particular 
relations. 
* * * 
My investigations along these lines will center on a work long considered 
a classic but which remains consistently alienating to many audiences: Samuel 
Beckett's Waiting for Godot. Since the first performance the play has received 
mixed reactions.24 Martin Esslin attributes this recurring phenomenon to the 
play's initial status as a succes de scandale.25 The publication of the text in November 
1952 and the radio broadcast in February 1952 apparently raised interest in the 1953 
premiere performance as an intellectual/social event not to be missed.26 Despite 
some good reviews however, attendance dropped off after the first night and, until 
its scandalous nature spread, those involved had to "drum up support for it among 
their friends."27 The controversial nature of the first production is exemplified by a 
description of an outburst from the audience after Lucky's monologue: 
The curtain had to be brought down . . . as twenty well-dressed, 
but disgruntled spectators whistled and hooted derisively. During 
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a stormy intermission, the most irate protestors came to blows 
with the play's supporters, then trooped back into the theater 
only to stomp noisily out again as the second act opened with 
the same two characters still waiting for Godot... , 2 8 
Accompanying this level of rejection, offers to translate the play and 
produce it in different countries came in one after another. That fall eight 
simultaneous productions were being staged in Germany; and the Paris production, 
remounted in September, toured France, Switzerland, Italy and Germany.29 
Waiting for Godot, now considered a dramatic cliche more frequently 
than a model of contemporaneous engagement with the unpresentable, was written 
in France in 1948-1949, in the years just following World War II. The easy 
identification of this play with its accumulated and familiar themes and meanings 
calls for a particularizing of Beckett's representational practices.30 
Although an abridged version had been broadcast on French radio February 
17,1952, En Attendant Godot was first performed in Paris at the two-hundred-and-
thirty-seat Theatre de Babylone on January 5, 1953. Directed by Roger Blin who 
also played Pozzo, the cast included Pierre Latour as Estragon, Lucien Raimbourg 
as Vladimir, Serge Lecointe as the boy, and Jean Martin, who was brought in to play 
Lucky three weeks before the opening. Beckett attended almost all of the rehearsals 
and made suggestions to Blin which were frequently incorporated.31 Designed by 
Sergio Gerstein, the set for the small stage consisted of simple and readily available 
elements largely due to a lack of money. The tree was fashioned out of coat-
hangers and dark crepe paper with green paper leaves.32 A light green cloth draped 
the sides and back of the stage, and the lighting effects were minimal.33 Three oil 
cans with light bulbs were used to light the space: two from the back of the house 
and one behind the stage to project both the sun and the moon.34 This meant that 
the first act was performed in near obscurity. Many of the costumes and set pieces 
were found at flea markets or pulled from the garbage.35 All the characters wore 
bowler hats, Vladimir and Estragon in black coats and pants, Pozzo dressed as an 
"English gentleman farmer," and Lucky wore a long white wig, a striped shirt, 
long embroidered red and green coat, and had red eyes and lips.36 The movements 
of the characters were directed to include as much "stylized action" as possible.37 
This included the abrupt hesitant movements of Vladimir and Estragon, what Beckett 
referred to in his 1975 production as "approach by stages,"38 as well as Lucky's 
continual shaking.39 Speech and movement were consciously separated. The plot 
of the play is immensely familiar to nearly anyone who has heard the title: two 
people, twice visited by two other men, wait for a man who never comes, twice. 
Waiting for Godot was written according to Beckett "as a relaxation, to get 
away from the awful prose I was writing at the time."40 As if written without the 
knowledge of conventional attributes of dramatic representation, Waiting for Godot 
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is conspicuously empty of the constituent elements of these systems—or seems to 
parody them. The characters, action, language, time and location in the play are 
not so much empty as they are drained of their substance. The play does not 
thematically present a process of decline from completeness, but rather seems to 
exhibit a state of continual entropy. 
The action that occurs in Waiting for Godot is replete with futility. These 
actions are more specifically activities, enterprises without the history or impact 
of dramatic action. The play opens with Estragon attempting to pull off his boots. 
Giving up he declares, "Nothing to be done."41 When a few moments later he 
finally achieves the removal, he is unable to find anything that would justify his 
discomfort. "Well?" asks Vladimir. "Nothing," is the reply. "Show," demands Vladimir, 
but "There's nothing to show."42 The same futility of effort occurs with Vladimir's 
bothersome hat. From Vladimir's suppressed laughter to Pozzo's answering 
Estragon's question ("Why doesn't he put down his bags?"), from Pozzo's exit to 
Didi and Gogo's decision to leave, each activity with potential for significance has 
been drained of even its conventional import. Nothing in the play can achieve the 
status of dramatic action. 
In Waiting for Godot, however, a reminder of a particular and constant 
occasion is repeated: Vladimir and Estragon are waiting for Godot. As redundant 
and inane as this seems in the face of the title of the play, it reveals an aspect of the 
activities that distinguishes their characteristic futility from that of Beckett's later 
Endgame. In the end all the activities are justified, determined or referenced to this 
fundamental tenet. Vladimir declares: 
What are we doing here, that is the question. And we are blessed 
in this, that we happen to know the answer. Yes, in this immense 
confusion one thing alone is clear. We are waiting for Godot to 
come—,43 
This lies behind their being in this place and time, regardless of doubts concerning 
the accuracy of the convictions of these two regarding where and when they are 
located. As such, the waiting almost achieves the status of a dramatic action. The 
difficulty here is that "waiting" is so near to complete passivity. Even the centrality 
of this unlikely drama is undermined as either they are waiting for Godot—"or for 
night to fall," as Vladimir belatedly concludes the above monologue. 
The enterprises undertaken in the play are only relatively ineffective, futile, 
incomplete, or aborted. They seem drained only in relation to actions of fulfilled 
import. In a play in which Godot arrives, there would be the theoretical possibility 
of substantive dramatic action because the importance of his arrival will form a 
means of justifying the characters' actions. These actions could then be assigned 
a value. In this play, where the premise of the characters' existence in time and 
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space is relative to Godot's arrival, all actions and activities, all motions and displays, 
are denied the relation with that independent observer which would provide the 
possibility of assigned value. 
The characters in Waiting for Godot are reduced to figures, producing the 
activities as a by-product of their existence. Their pasts are less keys to their 
characters than material for present activity. Vladimir says, "We were respectable 
in those days. Now it's too late."44 This change in fortunes does not deepen his 
character, as it might in a more conventional tragic character who has fallen from 
a past respectability, but neither does it serve to heighten the comedy. For although 
the characters have often been related to music hall, vaudeville, or silent movie 
comedians, here this change in fortune does not give the two a freedom of a movement 
(such as Chaplin's little tramp who lives outside social conventions) or turn them 
into objects of fun (such as Buster Keaton). Rather this speech is material with 
which Vladimir fashions a musing conversation to pass the time. "In the meantime 
let us try and converse calmly, since we are incapable of keeping silent."45 He 
performs an activity with language which has only a tangential relation to character. 
This effect is reproduced widely in the play so that characters seem reduced 
to figures. But where Vladimir and Estragon are traces of more solid selves, Pozzo 
and Lucky do undergo a transformation. At their appearance in the second act 
Pozzo is blind and Lucky mute. But again these transformations do not so much 
expand the figures into the fullness of characters, but instead seem unmotivated 
occurrences that signal a characteristic diminishment. The two are questioned 
about their infirmities but no clear development is linked to either the blindness or 
the muteness. In fact it is suggested that these might not be Pozzo and Lucky (or at 
least the same Pozzo and Lucky who appeared in the first act) as Pozzo does not 
remember having met them the day before. This too is subject to uncertainty 
because, "tomorrow," Pozzo says, "I won't remember having met anyone today. So 
don't count on me to enlighten you."46 The result of these transformations suggests 
a diminishment congruent with Beckett's comment regarding why the boots of the 
second act are too big for Estragon where in the first act they were too tight. In a 
letter to Colin Duckworth, Beckett writes, "the second day boots are no doubt same 
as first and Estragon's feet wasted, pined, shrunk and dwindled in interval."47 The 
Boy who appears near the end of each act—played by the same actor—nevertheless 
denies that he has come before. In terms of character, there seems to be entropic 
diminishment, with the far end of the spectrum represented by Mr. Godot, who 
never even achieves appearance. Coupled with the surrounding uncertainties, this 
entropic dwindling creates an instability. The diminishment does not end nor is it 
foreseen to end. Neither does it have a starting point. The action and characters 
are not complete at the start of the play nor empty at the end, rather they are in a 
career without beginning or end. It is such that its continuance is theoretically 
infinite. 
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The time of the play is also diminished in substance. "And is it Saturday? 
Is it rather not Sunday? (Pause.) Or Monday? (Pause.) Or Friday?"48 Estragon's 
badgering uncertainties are paralleled in Pozzo's vociferous denunciations: 
Have you not done tormenting me with your accursed time! It's 
abominable! When! When! One day, is that not enough for you, 
one day he went dumb, one day I went blind, one day we'll go 
deaf, one day we were born, one day we shall die, the same day, 
the same second, is that not enough for you? 4 9 
Estragon's questioning of the day and Pozzo's rant articulate a sense of 
time that is uncertain—that might as well be all the same moment. The means of 
measuring time is unavailable. As time is relative, it passes meaningfully only with 
reference to a reliability outside the vagaries of time: a watch, the sun or stars (with 
a reliable sense of direction), atomic decay, etc. Without this measurement, time 
becomes a fluid force, at once endless and simultaneous. In Waiting for Godot 
there is no outside, independent entity that can be reliably referenced to mark the 
passage of time, even Pozzo's watch can't be found. The substance of time has 
been drained and diminished into uncertainty. 
Frequently in this play, language is reduced to its mechanistic aspects. 
Vladimir and Estragon take part in exchanges reminiscent of Vaudeville chatter. 
From the exchange about "all the dead voices"5 0 to Vladimir's song opening the 
second act to the exchange of insults, words are used with less regard for meaning 
than for their material function. 
Vladimir: Moron! 
Estragon: That's the idea, let's abuse each other. 
They turn, move apart, turn again and face each other. 
Vladimir: Moron! 
Estragon: Vermin! 
Vladimir: Abortion! 
Estragon: Morpion! 
Vladimir: Sewer-rat! 
Estragon: Curate! 
Vladimir: (with finality) Crritic! 
Estragon: Oh! (he wilts, vanquished, and turns away) 
Vladimir: Now let's make up. 5 1 
There is less concern for the effects of these insults than for the function 
of the game that the exchange forms. The language is not empty, meaningless, nor 
nonsensical—merely without any but an aesthetic function. Vladimir and Estragon 
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are not insulting each other in the way one might expect from a fighting pair, but 
the words are not completely senseless. Rather they fulfill a particular function: 
the language is used as a game. 
This diminished function of words should not be confused with Ludwig 
Wittgenstein's notion of "language games." For Wittgenstein, the meaning of 
language resides in its use. He uses the term "language games" to talk about the 
confluence of rule-bound, situational, contextual and historical factors during and 
in which language could be said to have meaning. Language is a relative 
phenomenon, subject for its significance to a range of correspondent references 
and links that extend beyond a sole reliance on the syntactical. According to 
Wittgenstein language acquires its meaning through its utilization in a complex of 
verifiable relations. " In Waiting for Godot language becomes a game because it is 
denied the reliability of independent verification. 
The "exchange of insults" in the play cannot be said to take part in what 
might be called an exchange of insults between a fighting pair in actual argument 
not only because it is a theatricalized representation. That is, this difference does 
not depend on the comparison between a staged exchange and a "real" exchange. 
It is a game of a different nature, as well, from what such an exchange might be for 
George and Martha of Edward Albee's Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf? 
In Albee's play, although game-playing abounds, the language game for 
their exchange is played according to the rules of their tangled relationship and the 
rules of language. This does not mean grammatical rules, but rules of 
communication—rules by which language functions in everyday life. So when 
Martha says "You pig!" to George, he has several possible options for reply including 
"Oink! Oink!", but his options do not include "Brick!" Such rules can be easily 
deduced from the script of Virginia Woolf because its use of language can be 
independently verified. Even though the characters play games, they are games 
with rules drawn from life—verifiable with reference to a larger reality. 
Vladimir and Estragon have no such luck. When Vladimir says "Curate!" 
the rules say Estragon must respond with another insult, but the rules of this game 
are only verifiable with reference to the two players. The rules of this game are not 
correspondent to a larger reality. This creates a sense of "falseness" to the exchange. 
True, Vladimir and Estragon seem to be aware of the "falseness" of their exchange, 
but this is only "false" in relation to a "true" exchange that has no place in the play. 
The self-awareness of the game does not make it any less a game. The function of 
this exchange is a reduction from the potentially full and expressive function that 
language has in everyday life, or in such a play as Albee's. The function of language 
in Waiting for Godot then is a (relatively) diminished one to the extent that it lacks 
the stability of the verifying relations that would establish its significance. 
The appearance of diminishment is a relative phenomenon, proportional 
to the fullness and depth of a doubled representation. It is important to note that 
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the reductions of the play's elements (action to activity, character to figure, time to 
a fluid moment, language to game) can generally only be seen as such in their 
relations with more conventional dramaturgy. Reduction requires a capacity for 
fullness, for absolutes. The diminishment of these aspects within the play is not a 
digression from full to empty. There is no point in the play where they appear, in 
any real sense, fuller. Within the play the diminishment is a constant direction 
rather than an unfinished movement. 
In relation to more conventional dramatic devices, these aspects of Waiting 
for Godot appear reduced or bare, shorn of all but the minimal requirements. The 
play might then be seen as, for example, a minimalist manifestation of a humanistic 
thematic. This perspective, however satisfying, can obscure the movements on the 
play's surface by construing them as indicative of its depth. This depth constructs 
the play as signifying: a representation of human misery,53 a model of anti-theatre,54 
and a doubling evasion of presence.55 From this perspective the play becomes a 
subject capable of producing statements. For example: the play marks a place 
within a shift in consciousness as delineated by twentieth century thinkers,56 it 
reveals the shapes of archetypes,57 it makes an antagonistic renunciation of the 
relations on which art's redemptive value is structured,58 it is an inventory and a 
defense of Beckett's Irishness,59 or it is in an involved relation with his biography.60 
The diminishments of Waiting for Godot can be seen to produce a surface, 
not of meaninglessness or cliche, but of representation. When the representational 
surface is examined, the practices articulated, the apparent motions on the surface 
can be seen as the matter out of which dramatic products are formed. These 
substances are in a process that might more accurately be described as a vector of 
direction rather than of movement. This is a directional signpost rather than a 
journey. Nobody wastes away, they are merely becoming smaller. Time and motion 
do not stop, but merely become more indeterminate and effect-less. Language does 
not become nonsensical, but collapses upon itself in repetitive games. These 
aspects are the results of practices which can be said to create a trapped surface of 
representation. 
In the context of astrophysics, a trapped surface is "a two-dimensional 
surface . . . on which the gravitational field is so strong that light rays directed 
outward from its surface 'fall back inward'. " 6 1 A star becomes a trapped surface 
before it becomes a black hole. A phenomenon implied by Einstein's general theory 
of relativity in the formation of black holes, this occurs when the radius of a collapsing 
body such as a star decreases past a certain proportional distance known as the 
Schwartzschild radius, or event horizon. "After this stage, nothing further that 
happens to the collapsing body can affect the region outside the Schwartzschild 
radius."61 Because of the density of the mass inside the event horizon, spacetime 
is curved by its immense gravitational pull. Light, too, is affected by gravity and as 
the density reaches a certain point light cannot radiate beyond the event horizon. 
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The collapsing body reaches infinite density and infinitesimal mass and becomes a 
singularity. An outside observer could never see anything once the event horizon 
has been crossed because any light pointed into the black hole would not reflect 
back, and because of the immense gravity no light from this surface could escape. 
A trapped surface occurs at just the point when the size decreases beyond the event 
horizon and nothing escapes the collapsing body. It is an aspect of the geography 
of spacetime. 
The practices utilized by Beckett in Waiting for Godot can be said to 
create a trapped surface of representation. Representation occurs at the point of 
diminishment beyond which there is no possibility of independently verifiable 
observation. The aspects of the play affected by Beckett's practices are in a state 
of diminishment. Character, action, time, and language seem reduced because they 
have been taken beyond the representational event horizon: there is no possibility 
of independent observation because nothing that would serve as a message is 
allowed to escape. The futility and incompletion of the play are always observed 
from a relation denied the stability of independent measurement. 
This trapped surface is an aspect of the geography of representation. It is 
a surface, impossible to reach beneath. It is not in complete collapse, neither does 
it re-expand; yet it is always diminishing. Things are continually winding down. It 
is alone and being lost, out of reach and silent. But it is not unknowable. Aspects 
of its texture and composition interact with forces of its construction and its degrees 
of stability. It is the density of its gravity which precludes the possibility of verifying 
any organizing motion beneath the surface. We are left with the only recourse 
available to the astrophysicist: to judge the attributes of the object by the effect it 
has on its surroundings. This does not mean we are left with nothing to say, only 
that our knowledge of what lies below the surface cannot be discovered through 
optical examination. To think about representation in this mode is to be forced to 
approach this space on its own terms. 
Representation and the unpresentable meet in Waiting for Godot in the 
way that Beckett's practices allow the unpresentable to mark the space with its 
various effects. Beckett's representational practices in this work are not encumbered 
with the obligation to imitate or transfer. This absence, or perhaps more accurately 
this smoothness, is not one half of an equation between the author and the audience 
awaiting the completing process of transfer from one to the other during performance. 
The non-appearance of Godot is not an unresolved question demanding the 
resolution of interpretation. It is part of a collection of practices which smooth the 
representational space so that the unpresentable can texture this surface and make 
its presence known. 
The unpresentable in Beckett's play lies beneath the representational event 
horizon. As with Lyotard and Bacon the unpresentable is not directly depicted. As 
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in Deleuze's reading of Bacon, the representational space is made sensitive to the 
movements of the unpresentable. However, in the case of Waiting for Godot the 
unpresentable is not prodded into a movement whose force marks the 
representational space. Here the unpresentable remains hidden and quiet, as for 
Lyotard. But Beckett's practices do not directly address or make an active 
invocation of the unpresentable. Instead the immense gravity and weight of the 
unpresentable—unidentified and in its silence—is revealed in the strength of its 
acknowledged existence. It is this strength which gives the unpresentable its 
presence in Waiting for Godot. 
Its density is what prevents the direct transmittal of information. The 
information that it is possible to glean from approaching this work never seems to 
accumulate—or it accumulates in such profuse detail that it overwhelms efforts to 
give it a meaningful shape. Lucky's speech can be and has been mined for such 
information, but in the end it is a single muddled speech, broadcast in performance 
at great speed. The importance of its information is brought up against the means 
of its production and these aspects seem to be both striving for and struggling 
against any notion of significance. What one can say about information transmitted 
directly through this play seems always to be made from a position that has been 
hesitantly built of delicate material upon a shifting ground. Beckett's practices 
have left no stable structure from which to defend a proclamation of received 
information. To build a shelter of the scattered objects that remain requires nailing 
the wind to the door. 
The immense gravity of the unpresentable is also what redistributes the 
geography of surrounding phenomena to appear distorted, meaningless, or empty. 
Beckett has a reputation in some quarters as a dark prophet of human misery.63 
Rather than see the emptiness of Waiting for Godot as a sign or aspect of a 
represented condition, it is possible to see this meaninglessness as a ripple in the 
representational space. This is not to claim that Beckett's works are somehow 
misunderstood, and are actually light. The emptiness here is of the representational 
space, not necessarily the depiction of a condition of human emptiness. An 
investigation of Beckett's practices reveals the textures of a surface that was thought 
to be empty. If this emptiness is allowed to remain so, without the imposition of 
our interpretive stance, this surface reveals the textures created by the force of the 
unseen. This emptiness is a testament to the power and weight of an unpresentable. 
The effects of the unpresentable on the representational space, which can 
appear violent or extreme, are without ostensible cause but leave a complex and 
delicate texture. The textures of the representational space—the results of Beckett's 
representational practices—are intricately involved with the time and place of its 
manifestation. The historical, social, political, economic, and cultural conditions 
that inevitably surround the production of this work are manifested in the audiences 
and spaces for which this work is performed. The specific circumstances of each 
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